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EYES WIDE OPEN, MINDS WIDE SHUT:
ART, OBSCENITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years after a coalition of conservative politicians and organi-
zations declared war on controversial Contemporary art, the battle
rages on. Detroit's Museum of New Art (MONA) opened its fourth
"dirty show" this past Valentine's Day.' Including works by well-
known Contemporary artists Glenn Barr, Tom Thewes, and Niagara,
the exhibition was immediately condemned by Jef Bourgeau,
MONA's founder and former director, as "pornography pure and sim-
ple."' 2 Emphasizing that his opposition was about principles, not cen-
sorship, Bourgeau charged "dirty art" was an example of the
vanishing line between art and entertainment, and that viewers were
paying money to see "seedy bookstore" porn masquerading as fine
art.3 Bourgeau's own brush with administrative censorship makes his
opposition to this exhibition even more interesting; just over two years
ago, an exhibition of his own works was cancelled by the Detroit Insti-
tute of Arts.4
The controversy surrounding Detroit's dirty exhibition highlights
one dilemma facing controversial artists in contemporary America.
Immersed in a political, philosophical, art historical, and legal debate,
works like those struggling for recognition in MONA's exhibition are
in good company. Fifteen years ago, photographer Robert Map-
plethorpe's striking and shocking homoerotic photographs touched off
a nationwide controversy. 5 Today, he is fondly remembered for his
superb technique and remarkable "aesthetization of [a] supposedly
1. Joy Hakanson Colby, Is It Porn or Is It Art? You Judge "Dirty Show," DETROIT NEWS,
Feb.14, 2003, at 1C.
2. Id.
3. Id. The exhibition's organizers were, in fact, flattered by Bourgeau's charge and believed
his disapproval would attract a larger crowd curious to see the source of this brouhaha. Id.
Asked to define what made the exhibition's works "dirty," the show's creator referenced Dean
St. Souver's 2002 exhibition entry. Id. Souver's submission that year was a painting the artist
purchased at a garage sale, which depicted a young boy fishing with a man looking down on him
from a bridge. Id. Souver added the caption "Dirty is in the mind of the beholder." Colby,
supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 53, 57-60 and accompanying text.
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forbidden subject matter ' 6 at the "outer reaches of sexual experi-
ence."'7 Karen Finley, whose failed challenge to the National Endow-
ment for the Arts' "decency and respect" grant review criteria8 sent
shockwaves through the artistic community, continues to draw audi-
ences eager to see her performance works. 9
In spite of the growing critical and public acceptance of these
works, the nature and extent of First Amendment protection remains
ill defined and out of date, governed by an obscenity test and First
Amendment philosophy unable to separate valuable art from obscen-
ity. This Comment will describe the state of Contemporary art and
illustrate the failure of the United States Supreme Court's First
Amendment case law and theory to give today's controversial artists
the protection they deserve. To further this understanding, Part II will
provide a brief overview of art history through the Postmodern and
Contemporary movements. 10 Part II will then offer a survey of Amer-
ican obscenity cases, highlighting the inability of the Supreme Court's
current protection scheme to distinguish Postmodern art with sexual
content from obscenity. 1 Part III will then analyze the theoretical
foundations of the current obscenity test and suggest the problems
with its attempts to define art and artistic value.' 2 Part III will also
explore the reasons why artists, art insiders, judges, and "reasonable"
men and women are each unsuited to determine aesthetic merit in a
challenged work.13 Finally, Part IV will illustrate some potential con-
sequences of a continued failure to afford Postmodern and Contempo-
rary art sufficient protection, namely arbitrary law enforcement, self-
censorship, and regulation based on secondary effects. 14
II. BACKGROUND
This section will lay the legal and artistic foundations necessary to
understand the failure of the Supreme Court's obscenity jurispru-
dence to satisfactorily address Postmodern art with sexually explicit
content. It begins with a brief survey of art history since the mid-
6. EDWARD LUCIE-SMITH, VISUAL ARTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 329 (1997).
7. Edward de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere: The Law of Obscenity and the Assault on
Genius, 11 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 777, 782 (1993).
8. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
9. Finley performed her Make Love work-an attempt to understand post-September 11th
life-in September 2003 at Boulder's Museum of Contemporary Art. John Moore, Zoning Vio-
lations Push LIDA Off 'Balcony,' DENVER POST, Sept. 7, 2003, at F-16.
10. See infra notes 18-65 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 66-142 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 143-216 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 217-232 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 233-275 and accompanying text.
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nineteenth century, and traces the roots of Postmodern and Contem-
porary art back to the Modern era.15 Next, this section discusses the
origins of the Court's obscenity doctrine by first providing an over-
view of historical interpretations of obscenity and indecency statutes
by British and lower U.S. courts. 16 Finally, this section traces the
evolution of the United States Supreme Court's own obscenity
jurisprudence. 17
A. Understanding Art Today
To understand the problems faced by Postmodern and Contempo-
rary art, one must first understand the position these works occupy in
the history of art. For centuries, the success of an artwork was based
primarily upon the artist's ability to capture reality in a realistic way.18
Changes in patronage and the French Academy system in the nine-
teenth century profoundly affected society and artists, causing a
"gradual metamorphosis . . . in attitudes toward artistic means and
issues."'19 The product of this evolution was the "Modernist" move-
ment.20 Exemplified by innovative artists like Gustave Courbet 2' and
15. See infra notes 18-51 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-92 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 93-142 and accompanying text.
18. Pamela Weinstock, The National Endowment for the Arts Funding Controversy and the
Miller Test: A Plea for the Reunification of Art and Society, 72 B.U. L. REV. 803, 804 (1992).
19. H.H. ARNASON & MARLA F. PRATHER, THE HISTORY OF MODERN ART 17 (4th ed. 1998).
Governmental patronage of the arts waned in the mid-nineteenth century, and a newly-wealthy
middle class increasingly replaced state patrons. Id. at 29. These new collectors favored materi-
alistic ideas and ideology over the romantic, fantastical, and historical paintings prized by their
predecessors. Id. Furthering this break in tradition was a trend toward small-scale landscape
and genre paintings, a shift away from the "large, cumbersome scenes from antiquity" coveted
by the aristocracy. Id.
20. Id. For a good critical study of the rise and fall of Modernism, see ROBERT HUoHES, THE
SHOCK OF THE NEW (2d ed. 1991).
21.
Gustave Courbet, The Cliffs of Etretat After a Storm,
. available at http://www.art.com/asp/display-artist-asp/_/ui
3B72F718E2F44702B7597B912CDB6154/CRID-4604/is
Search-Y/searchString-courbet/posters.htm (last visited
Sept. 12, 2003).
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Edouard Manet,22 Modern art became self-conscious, emphasizing
color, composition, and spatial arrangement. 23 Instead of striving to
precisely capture life on canvas or in marble, Modern artists sought to
capture an emotion, a feeling, or a fleeting impression.2 4
In 1939, art critic Clement Greenberg surveyed the contemporary
American cultural landscape in an attempt to reconcile how one soci-
ety could simultaneously produce high and low culture: poetry by T.S.
Eliot and Tin Pan Alley songs, Braque artworks and Norman
Rockwell prints.25 Greenberg explored the relationship between an
aesthetic experience and the social-historical context of that experi-
ence, ultimately concluding that advanced art-the avant-garde-had
split from and leapt ahead of popular artwork.26 Leading the charge
that kept culture alive in the face of capitalism, Greenberg's avant-
garde blazed the trail that kitsch followed.27 On this foundation,
22.
Edouard Manet, Olympia, available at http://www.art.com/
asp/display-artist-asp//ui-3B72F718E2F44702B7597B91
2CDB6154/CRID-48/isSearch-Y/searchString-manet/
posters.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
23. See ARNASON & PRATHER, supra note 19, at 17.
24. Id.
25. Clement Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in ART IN THEORY 1900-1990: AN ANTHOL-
OGY OF CHANGING IDEAs 529-41 (Charles Harrison & Paul Wood eds., 1993). For further analy-
sis of Greenberg's hi/low art distinction, see IRVING SANDLER, ART OF THE POSTMODERN ERA:
FROM THE LATE 1960S TO THE EARLY 1990S 1-5 (1996).
26. See generally id.
27. See generally Greenberg, supra note 25. Greenberg states:
[W]ith the introduction of universal literacy, the ability to read and write became al-
most a minor skill like driving a car, and it no longer served to distinguish an individ-
ual's cultural inclinations, since it was no longer the exclusive concomitant of refined
tastes. The peasants who settled in the cities as proletariat and petty bourgeois learned
to read and write for the sake of efficiency, but they did not win the leisure and comfort
necessary for the enjoyment of the city's traditional culture. Losing, nevertheless, their
taste for the folk culture . . . the new urban masses set up a pressure on society to
provide them with a kind of culture fit for their own consumption. To fill the demand
of the new market, a new commodity was devised: ersatz culture, kitsch, destined for
those who, insensible to the values of genuine culture, are hungry nevertheless for the
diversion that only culture of some sort can provide.
Kitsch, using as raw material the debased and academicized simulacra of genuine
culture, welcomes and cultivates this insensibility. It is the source of its profits. Kitsch
is mechanical; and operates by formulas. Kitsch is vicarious experience and faked sen-
sations. Kitsch changes according to style, but remains always the same. Kitsch is the
epitome of all that is spurious in the life of our times. Kitsch pretends to demand
nothing of its customers except their money - not even their time .... [Kitsch] borrows
from it devices, tricks, stratagems, rules of thumb, themes, converts them into a system
and discards the rest.
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Greenberg argued in 1961 that Modernist painting was the paradigm
of artistic expression,28 and that abstraction and the stained-color-field
painting of current painters Louis, Noland, and Olitski were the logi-
cal conclusion of a century's technical artistic evolution. 29 To him, the
simplified, authentic, pure, nonrepresentational, and serious nature of
these works made them the product of an unquestionable linear de-
velopment of artistic means and abilities.30 In 1980, Greenberg
summed up, "Modernist with a capital M [is] the simple aspiration to
quality, to aesthetic value and excellence for its own sake, as an end in
itself. Art for art's sake .... nothing else." 31
By the late 1970s, art became infused with a different ideology as
critics and artists grew dissatisfied with the "narrow confines" Mod-
ernism placed on art.32 Like many movements before it, Postmodern-
ism "retains as its hallmark the desire to break with the visual past and
strike out into new aesthetic territory" and strains against what Mod-
ernism taught artists, critics, and society to value. 33 For this reason,
Postmodern and Contemporary artworks often surprise viewers accus-
tomed to the Modernist paradigm. 34 Unlike Greenberg's serious
Modernism, Postmodernism is often unserious, impure, irreverent,
and derivative.35
As they broke with the Modernist dogma, these artists explored the
flip side of its paradigmatic autonomy and quality: relevance.36 Con-
fronting social issues rather than simplification, abstraction, reduction
and novelty, Postmodern artists set their sights on topical subjects.
Rejecting Modernsim's teachings about the supreme importance of
Id. at 534.
28. Clement Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in ART IN THEORY 1900-1990: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF CHANGING IDEAS, supra note 25, at 754-60. See also Amy M. Adler, Post-Modern Art and the
Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1363 (1990).
29. SANDLER, supra note 25, at 2.
30. See generally Greenberg, supra note 28. Greenberg states:
I cannot insist enough that Modernism has never meant anything like a break with the
past. It may mean devolution, an unraveling of anterior tradition, but it also means its
continuation. Modernist art develops out of the past without gap or break, and wher-
ever it ends up it will never stop being intelligible in terms of the continuity of art.
Id. at 759.
31. SANDLER, supra note 25, at 2 (citing Clement Greenberg, Modern and Post-Modern, ARTS
MAG., Feb. 1980, at 65) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. ARNASON & PRATHER, supra note 19, at 699.
33. Anne Salzman, On the Offensive: Protecting Visual Art with Sexual Content Under the First
Amendment and the "Less Valuable Speech" Label, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1215, 1224 (1994).
34. Id.
35. "[A]rt that denies the value of art has become the most valuable art around." Adler,
supra note 28, at 1367 (citing Elizabeth Frank, Art's Off-the-Wall Critic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 78).
36. SANDLER, supra note 25, at 4.
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form, the Postmodernists began to emphasize the subject matter.3 7
Addressing issues of race, gender, nationality, and the impossibility of
true originality in the Postmodern age, 38 the plethora of styles under
the Postmodern umbrella are alike in both their celebration of diver-
sity and their frequent attempts to deconstruct the underlying assump-
tions of the Modern era.39 Rejecting the authenticity prized by the
Abstract Expressionists, 40 the commercialism celebrated by Pop Art,4 1
37. Id. at 4-5.
38. By the 1970s, more and more members of the artistic community came to believe that art
had reached the limits of the Modernist paradigm. Id. at 7-8. In 1969, critic Irving Sandler
explained this phenomenon: "A limit in art is reached when an artist's work comes as close as
possible to being non-art." Id. at 7. What once was shocking artistic newness had become estab-
lished and institutionalized and artists, frustrated with Modernist restrictions, began to look be-
yond the teachings of Greenberg and other Modernist critics. Id. at 8. A similar sense of
frustration is expressed in the personal journals of Nirvana singer/songwriter/guitarist Kurt
Cobain: "I feel there is a universal sense amongst our generation that everything has been said
and done." KURT COBAIN, JOURNALS 18 (2002).
39. By understanding political and linguistic institutions as conventions rather than "natural
facts," these artists look at the assumptions underlying social and political discourse that governs
contemporary life. ARNASON & PRATHER, supra note 19, at 699. As Professor Adler explains,
deconstruction is a multidisciplinary "critical practice that explores the failures and contradic-
tions of language and of the systems of thought derived from it." Amy Adler, What's Left?:
Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1518
(1996). Deconstruction is founded on the premise that words have a Janus-like quality and pos-
sess a "double, contradictory, undecidable value." Id. (quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINA-
TION 221 (Barbara Johnson trans., Univ. Press 1981) (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This practice is relevant to a discussion of Postmodern Art because of the tendency of these
artists to work from within the discourse they seek to undermine, using language or images of a
system to ridicule it. Id. at 1519. Superficially similar because they share a common symbolic
language, these critical works are vulnerable to the activism of would-be censors who seek to
purge society of "harmful," "offensive" words and images. Id. For further reading on the role of
deconstruction in Postmodern art, see SANDLER, supra note 25, at 375-424.
40. The works of Abstract Expressionist painter Jackson Pollock exemplify the authenticity
prized by Modernism. Abandoning brushes and an upright easel, Pollock began working directly
on the floor of his studio, dripping paint on the canvas either from the can or with objects like
trowels and sticks. FROM EXPRESSIONISM TO POST-MODERNISM: STYLES AND MOVEMENTS IN
20TH-CENTURY WESTERN ART 20-22 (Jane Turner ed., 2000). Pollock's paintings record his
sweeping gestures in a style Pollock described as "energy and motion made visible"; reminiscent
of the Surrealist technique of Automatism, Pollock's action paintings are a permanent record of
the actual physical movement of the artist. Id. at 21.
Jackson Pollock, No. 8, 1949, © Neuberger Museum of Art
41. In the late 1960s and 1970s, a number of artists grew alarmed with what they perceived to
be the commodification of art. SANDLER, supra note 25, at 12. Disgusted with the thirst of the
market for objects that could be bought and sold, a number of artists reacted by creating art that
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and the novelty prized by Greenberg, the Postmodernists began to
challenge the distinction between avant-garde and kitsch. They mixed
media, recycled old styles and symbols, combined kitsch and high cul-
ture, embraced stylistic diversity and strove to engage the social con-
text.4 2  Art critic Edit DeAk remarked in 1984 that Postmodern art
produced "the shock of recognition instead of the shock of the new." '43
Conceptual art embodies this break from Modernist values.
Though identifiable in the early twentieth century, 44 Conceptual art
truly emerged in the 1960s. Assuming a variety of forms, Conceptual
art exists only in the viewer's perception and individual interpretation
could not be commodified in order to "[erode] the very foundation of the art market," according
to critic Barbara Rose. Id. (quoting Barbara Rose, Problems of Criticism, VI: The Politics of Art,
Part III, ARTEORUM, May 1969, at 46-48). Conceptual and Performance art are two products of
the desire to produce artistic expression while denying the capitalist market economy any object
to sell. Id. at 11.
Andy Warhol, Tomato Soup (from Campbell's Soup I portfolio), 1968,
© Museum of Modern Art
42. SANDLER, supra note 25, at 1-18.
43. Id. at 4 (citing Edit DeAk, The Critic Sees Through the Cabbage Patch, ARTFORUM, Apr.
1984, at 56). For further reading on Postmodern theory, see DAVID HOPKINS, AFTER MODERN
ART: 1945-2000 (2000).
44. The "readymade" sculptures of Marcel Duchamp are notorious of these early Conceptual
works. SANDLER, supra note 25, at 6. In 1917, Duchamp signed a porcelain urinal "R Mutt,"
titled it Fountain, and submitted it as sculpture in the exhibition of the Society of Independent
Artists in New York City. Id. at 6. The exhibition's jury, which ironically included Duchamp
himself, refused to display the work, condemning it as "immoral," "vulgar," and nothing more
than a mere utilitarian object. Id at 28-30.
Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1964 (replica of 1917 original), © Philadelphia Museum of Art
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of a work.45 Refusing to limit art to a concrete object or interpreta-
tion, Conceptual art inspires a "continuing reflective encounter" by
presenting viewers with a question to consider or a challenge upon
which to reflect.46 Demanding "mutual responsibility of artist and
spectator," the connection that a Conceptual work of art forges with
its audience is of critical importance. 47 For, rather than presenting a
simple and unambiguous message, Conceptual art forces the viewer to
engage in a continuing debate. 4s
In the late 1980s, Contemporary art took a political turn as artists
focused their attention on race, gender, sexual orientation, and the
AIDS crisis. 49 As Professor Amy Adler notes, this shift was decidedly
Postmodern in character. 50 Art and artists defied the Marxist model
of "political art as propaganda, a51 and came to rely increasingly on the
principles of deconstruction.
It is in this context that any analysis of Postmodern "shock" art
must be situated. Often misunderstood, these works are splashed
across newspaper pages, 52 torn off museum walls, 53 condemned by
45. Id. at 4.
46. MICHAEL ARCHER, ART SINCE 1960 215 (1997).
47. Id. at 112.
48. Id.
49. Adler, supra note 39 at 1517-18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1518 n.74 (citing James Meyer, AIDS and Postmodernism, ARTS MAG., Apr. 1992, at
63).
52. In 1999, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani led a spirited attack on the Brooklyn Museum's Sensa-
tion exhibition. See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y.
1999). First on display in London's Royal Academy of Art, Sensation included a controversial
piece by Chris Ofili, an award-winning British artist. Id. at 190. The Holy Virgin Mary, intended
as a commentary on Western and African ideology and iconography, incorporating elephant
dung (a traditional African fertility symbol) and photographs of buttocks and female genitalia,
was publicly denounced by the Mayor. Id. at 191. At a press conference, Mayor Giuliani stated
that Ofili's collage was "sick" and offensive. Id. Soon afterward, the Mayor filed a suit to cut all
city funding for the museum and cancel the lease. Id.
Chris Ofili, The Holy Virgin Mary, 1996, © Brooklyn Museum of Art
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outraged viewers, and even symbolically torn to pieces on the Senate
floor.54 In a sense, works that speak to the viewer in such powerful
ways have succeeded. 55 By provoking viewers rather than simply ex-
isting as beautiful things, these works invite viewers to question, con-
sider, or defend their own religious, political, or moral beliefs.56
Shocking and beautiful by turns, Robert Mapplethorpe's photogra-
phy grabs a viewer's attention. One of America's most celebrated
photographers, Mapplethorpe, created sensual images of flowers, in-
sightful portraits of celebrities, and classically presented nudes. 57
53. In 1990, the City of Cincinnati sued the Contemporary Arts Center and its executive di-
rector Dennis Barrie. De Grazia, supra note 7, at 810-17. The Perfect Moment, a Mapplethorpe
retrospective, opened at the Center on April 6, and included many of Mapplethorpe's most
famous images: floral still lives, celebrity portraits, a sample of homoerotic photographs, and
several images of nude children. Id. at 815. One day later, on April 7, Barrie and the Gallery
were indicted by a grand jury for exhibiting "obscenity" and "child pornography." Id. at 811.
Police raided the gallery, ordered 400 patrons to leave, then seized seven photos. Id. Anthony
Eckstein, a member of the jury that acquitted both defendants, noted: "[The State's argument]
was missing an ingredient. [The exhibition] had artistic value, and that's what kept it from being
obscene. We thought the pictures were lewd, grotesque, disgusting. But like the defense said, art
doesn't have to be pretty or beautiful." Id. at 816.
54. "Shocking, abhorrent and completely undeserving of any recognition whatsoever," New
York Senator Alphonse D'Amato commented in response to photographer Andres Serrano's
Piss Christ, an image of a plastic crucifix submerged upright in a Plexiglas tank filled with the
artist's urine. Id. at 789. In an essay in the exhibition's show catalogue, renowned art history
professor Donald Kuspit noted that Serrano's work was intended as an attack on American
superficiality. De Grazia, supra note 7, at 789. Senator D'Amato dramatized his disagreement
with Kuspit's analysis by tearing up his copy of the catalogue on the Senate floor. Id.
55. For a good background on the theory underlying Postmodern Art, see SANDLER, supra
note 25, at 332-74.
56. Id.
57. Speaking of his choice to photograph black male nudes, Mapplethorpe cited the lack of
such images in art history: "I was attracted visually. That's the only reason I photographed
them. But once I started, I realized there's a whole gap of visual things. There have been great
photographs of naked black men in the history of photography, but they are very rare." De
Grazia, supra note 7, at 781.
Robert Mapplethorpe, Calla Lilly, 1988, © The Mapplethorpe Foundation
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While these photographs are reproduced in coffee-table books, calen-
dars, posters, and stationary, Mapplethorpe's claim to fame and in-
famy are his images of sadomasochistic sex. These images capture a
seldom-considered subculture for the first time in fine art photo-
graphs.5 8 Personal and biographical, these images communicate
profound messages about art 59 and society.60
Robert Mapplethorpe, Gregory Hines, 1985, © The Mapplethorpe Foundation
Robert Mapplethorpe, Thomas, 1987, © The Mapplethorpe Foundation
58. For more information on the artist's life, see PATRICIA MORRISROE, MAPPLETHORPE: A
BIOGRAPHY (1997).
59. Mapplethorpe's intent "was to open people's eyes, to realize anything can be acceptable.
It's not what it is, it's the way it's photographed." DeGrazia, supra note 7, at 782. Art critic
Susan Weiley noted:
Today we feel great art should never be overtly sexual. The sexually provocative is
relegated to pornographic magazines ... [Mapplethorpe] installs his exhibitions so that
the sexual images are interspersed with other subjects. We view a sadistic tableau side
by side with a celebrity portrait or a lyrical still life of baby's breath. The distinctions
between corruption and innocence are blurred. [Mapplethorpe] insists it is all the
same.
Id.
60. Art critic Susan Weiley observed:
The sexual photographs ... disturb us in light of our shift of attitude during this decade.
These exotic images bloomed in a hothouse atmosphere now grown chill with fear and
[Vol. 53:121
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In 1989, a retrospective of Mapplethorpe's works sparked such con-
troversy that a coalition of conservative senators, outraged by federal
support for exhibitions of Mapplethorpe's works, threatened to slash
the budget of the government-funded National Endowment for the
Arts.61 Fearing that exhibiting Mapplethorpe's works would jeopard-
ize their funding, several prominent galleries abruptly cancelled their
exhibitions of the controversial retrospective.62
In the 1980s and 1990s, sexually explicit art like Mapplethorpe's
faced obscenity challenges with surprising regularity.63 In each of
these situations, courts were called on to determine whether a chal-
death. Today it is difficult to view [the photographs] without considering their celebra-
tion of sensuality as, in retrospect, indictments of our innocence. We are all implicated.
They provoke a shudder similar to the one we feel looking at smiling faces in photo-
graphs of the Warsaw ghetto.
Id.
61. Republican Senators Jesse Helms, Alphonse D'Amato, and Slade Gordon adopted the
position that "[i]f the NEA could not go about its business of helping to 'create and sustain...
the material conditions facilitating the release of . . . creative talent' . . . without sponsoring
blasphemous and obscene art and artists, it ought to go out of business." Id. at 789-90. "You
know, man, I made [Piss Christ] in my own time on my own dime," Andres Serrano responded.
Id. at 789.
62. In August 1989, Senator Helms sponsored a Senate bill to establish government supervi-
sion of American artists and art institutions supported by the National Endowment for the Arts.
Id. at 784. Not long afterward, Christina Orr-Cahall, director of Washington D.C.'s Corcoran
Gallery of Art, abruptly cancelled the Gallery's opening of The Perfect Moment, a collection of
Mapplethorpe photographs. DeGrazia, supra note 7, at 784. Orr-Cahall and the Gallery's board
had received over one million dollars in N.E.A. grant money over the past several seasons, and
feared proceeding with the exhibition would be detrimental not only to their own museum, but
to "every other art institution." Id. An end to N.E.A. funding threatened the museum's cam-
paign to increase their endowment by damaging its ability to apply for private matching grants.
Id. at 784-85. Outraged by the Gallery's decision, over nine hundred members of the Washing-
ton gay, lesbian, and arts community mobilized in protest. Id. at 790. Their activity culminated
on the evening of June 30, 1989, when, from trucks parked across the street, slides of the Map-
plethorpe photographs were projected onto the outside walls of the Corcoran Gallery. Id.
63. Adler noted:
[A]rtists increasingly have been subject to criminal prosecution and arrest.... Since
[the Barry prosecution], there have been several prominent criminal cases brought
against artists: in both Alabama and Tennessee, prosecutors brought obscenity and
child pornography charges against Barnes and Noble for selling photography books by
Jock Sturges and David Hamilton. (Sturges' studio had been ransacked by an FBI raid
in 1993 but a grand jury refused to indict him.) Oklahoma brought a child pornography
prosecution against a video store for renting the Academy Award-winning film The Tin
Drum based on a novel by Gunter Grass. Cincinnati police arrested bookstore employ-
ees for renting a film by acclaimed Italian director Pier Paolo Pasolini. Hollywood
studios reportedly shunned the remake of the film Lolita because of fears of criminal
prosecution, despite the filmmakers' careful use of body doubles for all controversial
scenes, it took a year, as well as significant cutting, to find a studio willing to release the
film. Police have routinely stormed shows by performance artist Karen Finley. Photog-
rapher Spencer Tunick, known for his work depicting large numbers of nude people in
public places has been arrested five times.
Amy Adler, The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 206-08 (2000).
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lenged book, artwork, or performance work was obscene.64 The abil-
ity of courts to discern obscenity from protected artistic expression in
these cases is possible because of prior judicial attempts to define and
distinguish obscenity. An overview of these efforts is outlined
below. 65
B. Obscenity and the First Amendment
It is well established that the right to free speech is limited. 66 Be-
cause of their harmful effects and limited social utility, defamation,
perjury, and incitement to violence have long been classified as unpro-
tected speech. 67 Obscene speech is another category long recognized
to lie beyond the scope of First Amendment protection. 68 Conse-
quently, a finding that a photograph, painting, or performance is "ob-
scene" means that the federal, state, or local government may regulate
that work. Though some profess the ability to "know [obscenity]
when [they] see it,"69 American courts have struggled for decades to
define the precise parameters of obscenity.
This section will provide a brief overview of American obscenity
jurisprudence. Turning first to several statutory interpretations, this
section will identify the legal foundations of modern obscenity law.70
The United States Supreme Court's obscenity authority will then be
outlined and discussed. 71
1. Obscenity and the Lower Courts: Statutory Interpretation
The United States is neither the first nor the only country to deny
protection to obscene speech. The first American obscenity case,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sharpless,72 was decided in the na-
tion's infancy. The painting condemned in this case depicted a man
and woman captured in an "obscene, impudent and indecent pos-
ture. ' 73 Fearful of the corruptive power of images such as this, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in 1815 that the publication and
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 66-142 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
68. See infra notes 66-142 and accompanying text.
69. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. See infra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 93-142 and accompanying text.
72. 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815).
73. A more detailed description of the challenged artwork was withheld from the court, a
point of contention on appeal. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice William Tilghman
rejected the argument in Sharpless that the prosecution's description of his allegedly obscene
painting was deficient:
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exhibition of lewd artworks could be proscribed, and that public or
private exhibition of such works constituted an act of moral
turpitude. 74
In 1868, fifty years later, an English court adopted a narrower ob-
scenity test. Regina v. Hicklin75 involved a challenge to a pamphlet
entitled The Confessional Unmasked.76 Containing a lengthy diatribe
against the Catholic Church, the pamphlet exposed "the depravity of
the priesthood and the character of the questions [asked of] women"
during confession. 77 One of the earliest Western attempts to define
obscenity, the Hicklin court interpreted a Parliamentary law authoriz-
ing police seizure of obscene publications. 78 Sponsor Lord Campbell
explained that this legislation applied "exclusively to works written for
the purpose of corrupting the morals of youth, and of a nature calcu-
lated to shock the common feelings of decency in any well regulated
mind."'79 Campbell made it clear that any work that even pretended
to be literature or art, classic or modern, had little fear of being sum-
marily censored. 80
In spite of this, Lord Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of works subject to Lord Campbell's Act
in Hicklin. Holding the definition of obscene works of art as tending
"to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall,"
It is described as a lewd and obscene painting, representing a man in an obscene, impu-
dent and indecent posture with a woman. We do not know that the picture had any
name, and therefore, it might be impossible to designate it by any name. What then is
expected? Must the indictment describe minutely the attitude and posture of the
figures? I am paying for some respect to the chastity of our records; these are circum-
stances which may well be omitted.
Id. at 101-02.
Giulio Romano's 1524 painting, Two Lovers, provides an interesting comparison with the un-
named painting challenged in Sharpless. Painted for Federico Gonzaga, the Duke of Mantua,
Two Lovers is a fine example of the artistic tradition of erotic paintings, and thought to be the
artist's attempt to recreate one of the famous lost erotic pictures of antiquity. PAOLA TINAGLI,
WOMEN IN ITALIAN RENAISSANCE ART 134-35 (1997). Romano's work depicts a man and
woman lying on an antique bed. Id. Both figures are almost entirely nude, the woman lies
between the open legs of her lover, one arm around his neck, and she looks into his eyes while
she lifts a piece of drapery from his genitals. Id. An old woman, thought to be a procuress,
looks in on the couple through an open door. Id. The woman prominently displays a set of keys,
possibly a pun on the Italian word chiavare (to put a key in the lock), a colloquial term for sexual
intercourse. Id.
74. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 100.
75. Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
76. Id.
77. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 124-25 (Phila. County Ct. 1949).
78. Id. at 124.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Lord Cockburn condemned the pamphlet and created what is com-
monly known as the "pervert's veto."81
Cockburn's formulation of obscenity entered American First
Amendment case law in 1884 when the New York Supreme Court ap-
plied his corruption of the minds test in People v. Muller.8 2 Upholding
a conviction for selling indecent and obscene photographs, the court
broadened Hicklin, eliminating lawful intent as a defense for those
charged with distribution of indecent and obscene materials.8 3
As social norms evolved, however, the Hicklin obscenity standard
and the pervert's veto it created grew antiquated, 84 and the court's
concern with Hicklin grew more and more pronounced over time.8 5
Condemnation of an entire work based on the isolated reading of a
few passages, as allowed by Hicklin, could lead to widespread banning
of classic literature. 86 Responding to this concern, the court in Halsey
v. New York Society for the Repression of Vice87 held that allegedly
obscene literary works should be judged in their entirety, not by se-
lected paragraphs or passages. 88
By 1933, it was clear that Hincklin had fallen out of sync with post-
World War I American morality. Citing Halsey, a federal district
court in New York allowed publication of Ulysses, James Joyce's cele-
brated, experimental novel, in spite of its highly controversial con-
tent.89 Rejecting Hicklin, which allowed portions of a work to be
81. Donovan W. Gaede, Policing the Obscene: Modern Obscenity Doctrine Re-Evaluated, 18
S. ILL. U. L.J. 439, 440 (1994) (citing Randall D.B. Tigue, Civil Rights and Censorship-Incompati-
ble Bedfellows, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 105 (1985)).
82. 96 N.Y. 408 (1884).
83. Id. at 413.
84. See generally Donna R. Banks, Conservatism in the 1980s: Art and Obscenity in Cincinnati,
the Beauty and the Conflict, 34 How. L.J. 439, 444 (1991).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 136 N.E. 219 (N.Y. 1922).
88. Id. at 221.
89. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
According to Judge John M. Woolsey:
It is because Joyce has been loyal to his technique and has not funked its necessary
implications, but has honestly attempted to tell fully what his characters think about,
that he has been the subject of so many attacks that his purpose has been so often
misunderstood and misrepresented. For his attempt sincerely and honestly to realize
his objective has required him incidentally to use certain words which are generally
considered dirty words and has led at times to what many think is a too poignant preoc-
cupation with sex in the thoughts of his characters .... The words which are criticized
as dirty are old, Saxon words known to almost all men and, I venture, to many women,
and are such words as would be naturally and habitually used, I believe, by the types of
folk whose life, physical and mental, Joyce is seeking to describe .... As I have stated,
Ulysses is not an easy book to read. It is brilliant and dull, intelligible and obscure, by
turns. In many places it seems to me disgusting, but although it contains, as I have
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excerpted for consideration, the Ulysses court adopted the "impact"
test.90 Under this analysis, literary and artistic works must be read as
a whole, in a manner so as not to incite lustful thoughts or sexual
impulses.9' By requiring courts to consider allegedly obscene works in
their entirety, Ulysses forced courts to look at the role of these works
as "commentary on the inner communications of society.
' 92
2. Obscenity and the Supreme Court
By 1957, the Hicklin formulation was all but dead. Driving the final
nail in the coffin of its corruption-of-the-minds test, the United States
Supreme Court created a new obscenity test, in part an adaptation of
Ulysses, in part a novel creation. 93 Upholding convictions of two indi-
viduals charged with mailing obscenity in the companion cases of Roth
v. United States94 and Alberts v. California,95 the Court explicitly re-
jected Hicklin, and held the consideration of isolated passages "un-
constitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.
96
A landmark in American obscenity law, the Roth Court addressed
the issue of constitutional protection of obscene speech for the first
time.97 Looking to implicit assumptions of earlier First Amendment
mentioned above, many words usually considered dirty, I have not found anything that
I consider to be dirt for dirt's sake. Each word of the book contributes like a bit of
mosaic to the detail to the picture which Joyce is seeking to construct for his readers
.... If one does not wish to associate with such folk as Joyce describes, that is one's
own choice. In order to avoid indirect contact with them one may not wish to read
Ulysses: that is quite understandable. But when such a great artist in words, as Joyce
undoubtedly is, seeks to draw a true picture of the lower middle class in a European
city, ought it to be impossible for the American public legally to see that picture?
Id. at 184. Affirming Judge Woolsey's opinion at the circuit court of appeals, Judge Learned
Hand added:
That numerous long passages in Ulysses contain matter that is obscene under any fair
definition of the word cannot be gainsaid; yet they are relevant to the purpose of de-
picting the thoughts of the characters and are introduced to give meaning to the whole,
rather than to promote lust or portray filth for its own sake. The net effect even of
portions most open to attack . . . is pitiful and tragic, rather than lustful. The book
depicts the souls of men and women that are by turns bewildered and keenly apprehen-
sive, sordid and aspiring, ugly and beautiful, hateful and loving. In the end, one feels,
more than anything else, pity and sorrow for the confusion, misery and degradation of
humanity ....
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
90. Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 184.
91. Id. at 185.
92. Banks, supra note 84, at 445 (citing Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 185).
93. See Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 185.
94. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
95. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
96. Id. at 489.
97. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
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case law and to laws in each state and in more than fifty other nations,
the Court concluded that "obscenity is not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech or press. 98 However, in order to prevent all
artistic, literary, and scientific materials with sexual content from be-
ing condemned as obscene speech, the Court placed an important lim-
itation on the reach of obscenity. According to the Court in Roth,
speech that deals with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient inter-
est in sex," 99 tending to "excite lustful thoughts," fell outside the um-
brella of constitutional protection. 100 Whether a work appealed to the
prurient interest was to be decided by "the average person, applying
contemporary standards." 101 Adopting the standard first suggested in
Ulysses, the Court held that the dominant theme of a work, taken in
its entirety, must appeal to the prurient interest. 10 2
This definition of obscenity left judges better equipped to address
the problems presented by literary, artistic, and scientific works with
sexual content. Roth's flexibility forced an examination of challenged
works as a whole; 103 no longer could a court deem a work obscene
after reading only selected passages. 10 4 Roth's definition of obscenity
also focused on the "average person," examining the work from the
perspective of a contemporary community member rather than from
"the point of view of the person most vulnerable to moral
corruption."105
Roth survived for sixteen years with limited modification. In Smith
v. California,10 6 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a book-
seller, and held that obscenity convictions without a showing of scien-
ter violated the First Amendment. 0 7 The same year, in Kingsley
International Pictures v. Regents of New York University,l08 the Court
found a film version of D. H. Lawrence's novel, Lady Chatterly's
Lover, to be protected by the First Amendment. 10 9 Challenged as im-
moral and obscene, opponents argued that Kingsley's film character-
ized adultery as acceptable in certain circumstances. 110 Echoing a
98. Id. at 485.
99. Id. at 487.
100. Id. at 476 n.20.
101. Id. at 489.
102. Id.
103. Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
104. Id.
105. Gaede, supra note 81, at 441-42.
106. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
107. Id.
108. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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concern raised thirty-seven years earlier in Halsey,' the Court
soundly rejected this argument. A work, according to the Court in
Kingsley, could not be deemed legally obscene based only on its al-
leged portrayal of an idea "contrary to moral standards, the religious
precepts, and the legal code of a community. ' 112
The most significant modification of Roth came in John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General,1t 3 a 1966 chal-
lenge to another literary classic. This time challenging the sexually ex-
plicit eighteenth-century novel known as Fanny Hill, the Court held
that neither federal nor state governments could control the distribu-
tion of material unless three separate requirements were satisfied. 114
First, the Court required a showing that "the dominant theme of the
[work], taken as a whole, [must] appeal to [the] prurient interest in
sex."115 Second, the test required evidence that the material was pa-
tently offensive, an affront to "contemporary community standards re-
lating to the description or representation of sexual matters. 11 6
Third, Memoirs required a work be found to be "utterly without re-
deeming social value" before it could be classified as obscene.11 7
Though never supported by a majority of the Court, Memoirs added
a third prong to the Roth test: by showing that a work was not "ut-
terly" devoid of social utility, artworks challenged analyzed under this
test could earn the Court's protection.11 8 In this respect, Memoirs
gave disputed works a viable defense to obscenity challenges,11 9 and
constitutes the height of protection for sexually explicit materials.120
3. Paradigm Shift: Miller v. California1 2t
Following a decade of social and political upheaval, the Court
reevaluated its obscenity standard in 1973. By granting certiori in
Miller, the case of a publisher convicted of distributing obscenity in a
"mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books, eu-
111. Id. See discussion at supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
112. Kingsley Int'l Pictures, 360 U.S. at 688.
113. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 418.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. John Cleland's Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419-20.
120. After Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the latitude available under John Cleland's
Memoirs' "utterly without redeeming social value" test narrowed substantially. See infra notes
122-134.
121. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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phemistically called 'adult' material,' 22 the Court placed itself
squarely in the center of a national debate. The United States Com-
mission on Obscenity and Pornography, established by Congress in
1967, submitted its report in 1970.123 The Commission based its find-
ings in part on controversial empirical studies of the social impact of
sexual literature, and found no concrete link between sexually explicit
material and the commission of sex crimes.a24 Concluding that pat-
terns of sexual behavior were not "altered substantially by exposure
to erotica," the Commission recommended lifting laws prohibiting the
sale, exhibition, or distribution of sexual materials to consenting
adults, and the adoption of more targeted laws to limit commercial
distribution or display for sale of sexually explicit materials to mi-
nors.12 5 These findings challenged the well-established presupposition
that erotic materials were harmful to society, and were heavily
criticized. 126
California objected to Miller's material on two grounds. The Court
addressed each in turn, and concluded that the State had the best ar-
gument in each instance.
First, Miller mailed advertisements for his "adult material" in an
unsolicited mass mailing.1 27 The Court recognized the State's legiti-
mate concern that Miller's brochures, arriving in one's mailbox with-
out request or invitation, could offend the sensibilities of unwilling
adult recipients or, worse, fall into the hands of more vulnerable
readers. 128
California also objected to the substance of Miller's materials.
Though some descriptive text was included, the brochures consisted
primarily of drawings and pictures "very explicitly depicting men and
women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activi-
122. Id. at 16.
123. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 111 (1999).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. LANE V. SUNDERLAND, OBSCENITY: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION 78-79 (1974) (noting that "the complexities and subtleties of human sexuality
within society are extremely difficult to duplicate in the laboratory," and that the Commission
neglected "indirect effects" such as "the influence exerted on attitudes by public law, qua law,"
and "long-term effects of pornography"). See also Henry M. Clor, Science, Eros and the Law: A
Critique of the Obscentity Commission, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 63, 76 (1971) (emphasizing the "limita-
tions of behavioral science as a resolver of controversial questions in public policy," and sug-
gesting that "[i]t will be unfortunate if people conclude that the obscenity problem has now been
resolved because now, at last, we have the scientific facts"). The Minority Report of the Com-
mission took a very different view, finding at least an "arguable" link between obscene materials
and crime. Id.
127. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
128. Id. at 25.
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ties with genitals often prominently displayed."'1 29 To determine
whether the content of Miller's "literature" was within California's
power to regulate, the Court was forced to sharpen the line between
protected speech and unprotected obscenity in contemporary Ameri-
can society.
Holding that authors, artists, or filmmakers could not limitlessly ex-
ploit sex and nudity, the Court found that the First Amendment did
not protect, and that states were therefore free to regulate "patently
offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibitions of genitals. ' 130
For material that was objectionable, but did not fall into this cate-
gory of essentially per se obscenity, the Court formulated a new and
fundamentally different three-pronged test. To classify such works as
obscene, the trier of fact must find: (1) that the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) that the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (3) that the work, taken as a
whole, lacks any serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific
value. 131
The first prong of this test paralleled Roth and its progeny; the sec-
ond two materially broke with it. Explicitly rejecting Memoirs' "ut-
terly without redeeming social value" test,132 the Miller Court found
that First Amendment values were adequately protected by the power
of appellate review. 133 With its rejection of the Roth-Memoirs test,
Miller allowed a work to be categorized as "obscene" not because it
lacked any social value whatsoever, but because whatever social value
within the work is found to lack seriousness by a reasonable person
applying contemporary, local standards. 134 With this decision, the
Court attempted to offer lower courts an adequate tool to discern val-
uable speech from obscenity in twentieth century America.
4. Obscenity Since Miller
The same year Miller was decided, the Court clarified its new ob-
scenity formulation in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton in 1973.135 This
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 25.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Id. at 24-25.
133. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
134. Id. at 33-34.
135. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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case, involving the performance of two sexually explicit films, showed
lower courts how to apply Miller. Paris Adult Theater reaffirmed
Roth's conclusion that obscene speech was unprotected, and therefore
not entitled to First Amendment protection. 136 The Court also as-
serted that, while there may be a right to view obscene materials in
one's own home, 137 there was no corresponding right to view obscen-
ity in places of public accommodation. 138 This held true even with
respect to establishments admitting only consenting adults over
twenty-one years of age. 139 Furthermore, the Court rejected the no-
tion that legislatures should wait to regulate obscenity until empirical
evidence of the harmful effects of obscenity in society emerged to sup-
port these assumptions. 140
Attempting to further clarify how the trier should evaluate a work's
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, the Illinois trial
court's jury instruction was overturned in Pope v. Illinois.141 In Pope,
the Supreme Court interpreted Miller to ask not whether an ordinary
member of any given community would find serious value in the alleg-
edly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find
merit in the work.1 42
Since affirming Miller, the Court's conception of obscenity has re-
mained largely unchanged, and the test continues to mark the line be-
tween obscenity and protected artistic speech.
III. ANALYSIS
The consequences of the United States Supreme Court's failure to
update the obscenity test and properly protect the communicative
power of images are both varied and profound. Without adequate
prophylactic measures in place, artists whose works toe the line be-
tween beauty and obscenity have few defenses left to save their work
from condemnation. Part III of this Comment will examine, in light of
the cases outlined above, the extent of the problem facing sexually
explicit art today, and suggest several consequences for Contemporary
art and artists.143
136. Id.
137. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
138. Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 66.
139. Id. at 68-69.
140. Id.
141. The trial court had instructed the jury to analyze the challenged materials in the way
ordinary adults throughout the state would view the material. Pope v. Illinois, 413 U.S. 497, 504
(1987).
142. Id.
143. See infra notes 143-232 and accompanying text.
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A. Modern Law, Postmodern Art
For artists working on the fringes of social morality, the Supreme
Court's continued adhesion to Miller and its progeny affords sexually
explicit Contemporary artwork inadequate protection. A "Modern-
ist" test, Miller is a true reflection of the theory underlying Modern
art. 144 At the heart of Miller is the fundamental premise that it is
possible to separate good art from bad, and that reasonable people,
applying their community's prevailing standards, can distinguish be-
tween the two. 145 In the Modernist era, when artists strove to create
serious works and "art for art's sake,"' 4 6 this distinction may have
been possible.1 47 But times were changing even as the Court decided
Miller, and the line between good and bad art is growing murkier.148
1. Postmodern Art and Artistic Value
Over the last half-century, the theoretical foundations of Contem-
porary art have evolved at breakneck speed. Replacing the pattern of
evolution of techniques, subject matter and styles that dominated art
history, art since the 1970s has been characterized by a "multiplicity of
attitudes jostling for attention.' 1 49 As anarchic as this situation might
seem, it would be wrong to characterize this fragmentation and indi-
viduality as chaos. Despite this seeming diversity, the movements that
together constitute Postmodern and Contemporary art share strong
common bonds.
Built on the shoulders of Modernism, Postmodern art is a rejection
of Modernism's artistic requirements. 50 Free from the critic's de-
mands that art must be serious and intellectual to be great, 151 many
Postmodern and Contemporary artists also rejected the notion that
good art must have any traditional value.15 2 Adopting attitudes of ir-
reverence, frivolity, and insolence, these artists question, attack, and
144. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 172-189 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Consider, though, how many reasonable com-
munity members would have accurately predicted that Warhol's Brillo boxes and Campbell's
Soup can labels would have achieved such longstanding fame and continuing relevance.
148. See infra notes 149-216 and accompanying text.
149. According to Italian art critic Achille Bonito Oliva, the effect of this was to liberate
artists from looking strictly behind for inspiration; artists were now free to look anywhere.
ARCHER, supra note 46, at 145. "Trans-avantgarde," as Oliva called the art of the 1980s, quoted
from any period, movement, or style it liked, combining the elements of high and low art with
arts and crafts to produce something new, timely, and meaningful. Id.
150. Weinstock, supra note 18, at 820.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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deconstruct the foundations of Modernism. 153  These artists may
speak boldly to their audiences, often with deliberately shocking
images.154 Holding this art accountable to the antiquated Miller stan-
dard forces artists like Karen Finley to defend challenged works with
the very thing her works reject: overt, serious value. 55 Contemporary
artists use their works to force the viewer to consider the seeming
absence of the artist from the work and the multiplicity of interpreta-
tions of a work of art that are possible when the artist's intent be-
comes unknowable. 156 Allowing informative and provocative works
like these to be classified as obscenity because they lack serious value
perversely punishes artists for not including the very elements their
works reject.
2. New Math: Does Art + Sexual Content = Obscenity?
Categorizing explicit artworks like Finley's as obscene also flies in
the face of Roth's insistence that "sex and obscenity are not synony-
mous."'1 57 To the Roth Court, the "portrayal of sex . . . in art, litera-
ture, and scientific works ...is not itself sufficient reason to deny
material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press.' 58 As the cases set forth in Part 11159 demonstrate, the Su-
preme Court has determined that obscenity is "neither 'part of any
153. See Greenberg, supra note 25.
154. Consider the performance works by Karen Finley, one of the "NEA Four," whose pieces
are characterized by profanity, nudity, and frequently overt sexuality.
Described by one detractor as "obscenity in its purest form," Finley's images may be
shocking, but her message is much more profound. Combining "pain, rage, love, loneli-
ness, need, fear, dehumanization, oppression, brutality [,] consolation" and society's
objectification of women, Finley's performances force viewers to confront tough issues.
"Deathcakes and Autism," one of her earliest performance works, is "based on the
events of her father's funeral [Finley's father shot himself to death in the family's ga-
rage], where everyone became preoccupied with the food brought to the bereaved."
Finley recalls: "People were actually having arguments over which ham to eat. Or say-
ing, 'Was it much of a mess? Did you have to clean it up?' While [sic] they were bring-
ing in two dozen Tollhouse cookies."
De Grazia, supra note 7, at 829-30.
155. The work of Jeff Koons, a celebrated Contemporary American, has been included in
several of the prestigious Whitney Museum biennial exhibitions. Often resembling little more
than "tacky lawn sculpture," Koons's work blurs the line between valueless trash and valuable
"high" art. Commissioning highly skilled Italian craftsmen to sculpt a porcelain porn star in the
arms of the Pink Panther, Koons, for example, "makes art that looks like trash and trashes high
art." Adler, supra note 28, at 1367.
156. Id.
157. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 72-142 and accompanying text.
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exposition of ideas,' nor of more than 'slight social value.""' 60 Yet
Finley's works are dismissed as obscene "shock" art in spite of their
valuable content.
Often performing nude, Finley "places, dabs, smears, pours and
sprinkles food on her body to symbolize the violation of the female
characters whose tales she shrieks and whines on stage."'161 Address-
ing themes like incest, rape, violence, and discrimination, Finley's per-
formances are an assault on society's objectification of women and the
female body. 62 Her performances deconstruct the marginalization of
women, female sexuality,1 63 and the passive role society imposes upon
women because of their gender. 164 For example, though she appears
nude before her audience, Finley works to disrupt the voyeuristic
pleasure the audience would ordinarily take from viewing her body.165
160. Anne Salzman Kurzweg, Live Art and the Audience: Toward a Speaker-Focused Freedom
of Expression, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 442 (1999).
161. De Grazia, supra note 7, at 829.
162. Id. Consider the following excerpt from Finley's work entitled Aunt Mandy:
It's my body
It's not Pepsi's body
It's not Nancy Reagan's body
It's not Congress's body
It's not the Supreme Court's body
It's not Cardinal O'Connor's Catholic-church-homophobic-hate women-hate queers-
oppressive-DEVIL-SATAN-no children body
IT'S NOT YOUR BODY....
One day, I hope to God, Bush
Cardinal O'Connor and the Right-to-Lifers each
returns to life as an unwanted pregnant 13-year old girl working at McDonalds at mini-
mum wage.
Id. at 829-30.
163. Karen Finley often refers back to childhood feelings about her own gender:
When I was very young in my life I noticed that due to the fact that I was a woman I
wasn't able to express myself in the same way that men could. Certain opportunities
weren't open to me, and I considered that going against my freedom. When I was six, in
Catholic school, I wore culottes and I was told I couldn't wear them to school. But I did
anyway, and talked back to everyone, and wore shoe boots, which I guess were consid-
ered sexual or something. I didn't know what shoe boots meant but I continued to wear
them, and the culottes, and I felt that I had more body freedom wearing culottes and
boots.
Id. at 831.
164. See generally, Kate Linker, Representation and Sexuality, in Brian Wallis, ART AFTER
MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION (NEW MUSEUM OF CONTEMPORARY ART 1984).
For further analysis, see JAQUES LACAN, Guiding Remarks for a Congress on Feminine Sexuality,
in FEMININE SEXUALITY 86-98 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., 1958).
165. In this sense, Finley's works are similar to the two-dimensional photomontage images by
Barbara Kruger as seen in Kruger's slide show, We Are Your Circumstantial Evidence. Like
Finley, Krueger simultaneously constructs, deconstructs, and subverts the position assigned to
women as submissive, looked-at "other." SANDLER, supra note 25, at 390-95. The artist then
selects black and white images of women from mass media and crops and enlarges them to an
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:121
In doing so, she challenges the role of women as rightful subjects of
the controlling male gaze, 166 obliged to submit to being viewed. 167
Linking sexual or otherwise "offensive" speech with obscenity sim-
ply because both contain superficially similar subject matter exhibits a
fundamental misunderstanding of the role of sexual imagery in art and
society. Artistic genius has been realized for centuries through the
presentation and manipulation of socially offensive topics and images,
both sexual and nonsexual. A great and mysterious force in human
history, issues of gender and sexuality have captured the attention of
artists and patrons for centuries. Created to inspire, 168 titillate, 169 and
teach, 170 images of human sexuality have been used to address our
most universal problems. Thus, the history of art, music, and litera-
ture provides ample evidence that sexually explicit images and ob-
scenity are by no means synonymous. 171
B. Objective Definitions, Subjective Interpretations
Miller172 left the fate of challenged artworks to fact finders and state
legislatures. Before an artwork could be condemned as obscene,
Miller required that state statutes set forth specific acts and images
imposing scale. Id. Kruger then superimposes text (e.g., "we don't play nature to your culture,"
"you construct the category of missing persons," and "your gaze hits the side of my face") over
these images. Id. The cumulative effect of Kruger's works is to simultaneously draw the
viewer's eye and comment on the act of gazing at the image.
166. Linker, supra note 164, at 409. To Lacan, woman is shown to be "inscribed in an order of
exchange of which she is the object" of a system that subverts her. Id. at 409-10.
167. To Sigmund Freud, looking is inherent in a system of control. Id. at 407. He termed the
sexual pleasures of gazing at another person "scopophilia," and in Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality, noted the coexistence and alternation of scophoplilia in its passive and aggressive
forms in children. Id. Thus, to Freud, voyeurism was the pleasure in submitting another to a
distanced, controlling gaze.
168. Renaissance artisans in Florence usually included large-scale images of idealized nudes
and other explicit images inside ornate wedding chests (cassone). Given as gifts to newlyweds,
the images reinforced the importance of children to aristocratic families, and were believed to
both arouse the viewer, and to ensure the couple produced beautiful children. TINAGLI, supra
note 73, at 22-23.
169. See supra note 73.
170. High Renaissance artist Leonardo da Vinci conducted an extensive, humanistic study of
human anatomy in his quest to gain the wisdom that brought individuals closer to the state of
divine Grace. MARY ANNE STANISZEWSKI, BELIEVING IS SEEING: CREATING THE CULTURE OF
ART 53 (1995). Through life drawing and dissection, da Vinci and the other early Renaissance
artists were able to depict human subjects in realistic, proportional and three-dimensional form.
WALTER ROBINSON, INSTANT ART HISTORY 70-72 (1995). For further reading on the accom-
plishments of early Renaissance art and artists, see RICHARD G. TANSEY & FRED S. KLEINER,
GARDNER'S ART THROUGH THE AGES 734-35 (10th ed. 1996).
171. See infra notes 149-170 and accompanying text.
172. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see supra notes 121-142 and accompanying text
for further discussion.
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upon which obscenity convictions could be based. 173 If the challenged
artwork contained any of this imagery, the fact finder was required to
determine whether a reasonable' 74 person would consider the work,
"taken as a whole," to appeal "to the prurient interest in sex,"
whether the conduct described in the state's obscenity statute was de-
picted in a "patently offensive way," and whether the work as a whole
possessed any serious artistic value. 75
If the Court's aim was to craft a test that would allow rational men
and women to play a role in policing their community's morality,
Miller fits the bill, for it succeeds in giving fact finders the opportunity
to express their moral indignation and outrage. Whatever the benefits
of this conviction-as-symbolic condemnation may be, 176 Miller's utility
is severely undermined by its unsound theoretical basis.
1. The Problem with Defining "Art"
Implicit in Miller is the notion that "good" art is separate from
"bad" or "obscene" art.177 From a critical perspective, this may be an
impossible distinction to make because, before one can dismiss an im-
age or performance as "bad" art or "non-art," one must know what
"art" is.178 This in turn requires a definition of "art." While a full
discussion of the precise status and definition of art is beyond the
scope of this Comment, the following analysis serves to highlight the
difficulties of crafting any definition of art that would assist fact find-
ers in their analysis of a challenged artwork.
173. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
174. In Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1987), the Court held that fact finders were
required to assume the perspective of a reasonable person when evaluating a challenged
artwork.
175. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
176. Dan Greenberg & Thomas H. Tobiason, The New Legal Puritanism of Catharine MacK-
innon, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1396 (1993). Seen in this light, obscenity convictions are little
more than condemnations of behaviors contrary to a particular system of value judgments, "a
way for people to symbolically reject, through legal prohibition, such ways of thinking." Id.
While symbolic condemnations such as these clearly benefit those with the power and influence
to impose their normative constructs on the rest of society, they "run the risk ... of susceptibility
to the inflamed and transient passion[s]." Id. at 1397. When the expression involved is as emo-
tive and contentious as pornography, the risk of this kind of imposition becomes all the more
real. Id.
177. De Grazia, supra note 7, at 828.
178. Art, as society conceives of it today, is a recent phenomenon. STANISZEWSKi, supra note
171, at 28. Before it was contained in museums, exhibited by dealers, and acquired by collectors,
art was an essential part of everyday life. Id. at 39. The Sistine Chapel ceiling, one of the great-
est masterpieces of the Italian Renaissance, was not art as it the term is conceived of today. Id. at
43.
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a. What is Art?
The Miller Court assumed that, by their very essence, certain things
are art, and is joined in this understanding by the defenders of tradi-
tional artistic boundaries. 179 What the Miller Court ignores, however,
is that there has always been-and will always be-a purely linguistic
dimension to the definition of art.180 Words inherently lack rigid es-
sences;18' they are "empty variables that can be converted to different
uses."'1 82 For this reason, the meaning of any word is grounded in its
usage.' 8 3 To be called art, then, is little more than to be called art by
those that shape its usage-artists, critics, curators, art historians, and
so on. 84
The humanists have defined art as "a man made object demanding
to be experienced aesthetically."1 85 To them, the role of an artist and
his art is to rescue and restore the virtues of subjectivity, creativity,
and cultural memory in art.186 To others, the locus of art lies in the
artist him or herself. Kant, for example, believed that aesthetics 87
was the product of predestined genius, ungoverned by rules or sci-
ence. 88 There was, therefore, "no science of the beautiful, but only a
critique of it."1' 89 French artist Leon Gerome's Pygmalion embodies
this "definition" of art.190 In this painting, Gerome depicts the magi-
cal moment in which the sculptor's creation becomes flesh. 191 Thomas
Eakins, Gerome's student, seems to embrace a different definition in
his painting, William Rush Carving His Allegorical Figure of the
Schuylkill River. 192 Eakins stresses the artist as a leathery-faced work-
man, chiseling a modestly veiled female figure out of marble.' 93 To
179. Thomas McEvilley, Art in the Dark, in THEORIES OF CONTEMPORARY ART, 287, 289
(Richard Hertz ed., 1985)
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Erwin Panofsky, The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline, in Erwin Panofsky,
MEANING IN THE VISUAL ARTS 14 (Overlook Press 1974).
186. Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, Hans Haacke: Memory and Instrumental Reason, ART IN AM.,
Feb. 1983, at 98.
187. Aesthetics is the theoretical partner of Art. STANISZEWSKI, supra note 170, at 119.
188. Id. (citing IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (1790)).
189. Id.
190. LEO STEINBERG, OTHER CRITERIA: CONFRONTATIONS WITH TWENTIETH-CENTURY ART
57 (1972).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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Eakins, art is not a magical transformation but the product of the art-
ist's hard work. 194
Artists in the last century broadened the scope of the definitional
debate, pushing the boundaries of what images and objects to which
the term could be applied. This notion came to fruition in the late
1950s, when critic Alain Robbe-Grillet insisted that "if art is going to
be anything it has to be everything."'' 95 In a similar vein, French artist
Yves Klein declared, "Life, Life itself.. . is the absolute art. ' 196 Using
the process of universalization, artists began to appropriate objects
outside the realm of art into their artwork, transforming nonart into
art.197 In 1947, taking his cue from Marcel Duchamp's Ready-
mades,198 Klein signed the sky, symbolically appropriating it into his
personal portfolio. 199 In 1959, Piero Manzioni put a can of feces for
sale in an art gallery for its weight in gold;200 eight years later, Dennis
Oppenheim cordoned off areas of the world as art with his ceremonial
stakes called Sitemarkers.201
This process of universalization left art in a precarious position, for
"to be everything is not to be anything in particular. '2 02 Artists re-
sponded by courting nonart, their goals no longer to create art di-
rectly, but to "intend something else and still come up with art. o20 3
The result was art that was not traditional "art," but happenings, so-
cial action, experiment, behavioral stimulus or politics. 20 4 Hans
Haacke's installation works redefine the meaning of aesthetic repre-
sentation and exemplify this nonart art.20 5 Leaving traditional aes-
194. Id.
195. McEvilley, supra note 179, at 289.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra note 44.
199. McEvilley, supra note 179, at 289.
200. Id. at 287. Photographer Andres Serrano's Body Fluids series, including the highly con-
troversial Piss Christ image, is reminiscent of Manzioni's work. These images, produced be-
tween 1985 and 1990, use blood, saliva, and urine as though they were pure color. In Piss Christ,
Serrano immersed a plastic crucifix in a vial of urine. An exploration of the alternate realities
photographers can create with color, form and light, Piss Christ is an exploration of Serrano's
own struggle with his faith, and a comment on the contemporary exploitation of religious values.
Perhaps owing more to its title than to the actual image, Piss Christ provoked outrage among
religious groups and political conservatives who viewed it as an attack on organized religion.
ARCHER, supra note 46, at 198. The images leave the viewer to reconcile the beauty of the
substances with their known dangers. For an interesting discussion of the use of blood in art, see
BLOOD: ART, POWER, POLITICS AND PATHOLOGY (James M. Bradburne ed., 2002).
201. McEvilley, supra note 179, at 289.
202. Id. at 291.
203. STEINBERG, supra note 190, at 57.
204. STEINBERG, supra note 190, at 63.
205. Buchloh, supra note 186, at 98.
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thetic merit and traditional procedures of artistic production almost
entirely behind, Haacke views representation as the practice of ac-
cumulating and displaying knowledge as a critique of ideology.20 6 His
installation MetroMobiltan20 7 exposes the bitter irony of Mobil's sup-
port for an exhibition of ancient African culture at a time when Mobil
was the largest U.S. investor in South Africa and its apartheid govern-
ment. MetroMobiltan, like many of Haacke's works, also ridicules the
Modernist faith in the autonomy of art by exposing the "self-serving
reasons corporations [use] their profits to sponsor art, notably the
favorable publicity value of their patronage as well as the evils this
publicity was meant to counteract. '20 8
b. Is This Art?
In his 1757 dissertation, Of the Standard of Taste, David Hume ar-
gued that beauty was in the eye of the beholder.20 9 A proposition
frequently cited in support of aesthetic relativism, Hume's words
would have been interpreted in light of the eighteenth century notion
that taste was objective.210 Philosophers and critics subscribing to this
notion considered aesthetic beauty to be no less subjective than color,
warmth, or smoothness. 211 Thus, when Hume argued that there could
be no arguing about taste, he meant that similarly educated individu-
als would interpret beauty as consistently as they would interpret
sensation. 2
12
The Court's opinions in Roth2 l3 and Miller214 assume that there is
an objective line between art that is beautiful and worth protecting
and art that is worthless smut. An easy line to draw in the world envi-
206. Id.
207. STANISZEWSKI, supra note 170, at 268. MertoMobiltan consists of a miniature faqade of
Manhattan's Metropolitan Museum of Art with Haacke's version of exhibition banners hanging
outside. Id. at 268-69. The center panel advertises the Met's Treasures of Ancient Nigeria exhibi-
tion. Id. On the outer panels. Haacke has reprinted the response Mobil executives made when
asked by a shareholder to prohibit sales to South Africa: "[D]enial of supplies to the police and
military is not responsible citizenship." Id. Behind these panels Haacke placed photos taken
during the funeral for several black South Africans shot by the police in 1985. Id.
208. SANDLER, supra note 25, at 403.
209. Arthur C. Danto. Book Reviews: The Analysis of Beauty, available at http://
www.bookforum.com/archive/tocs/sum98.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see discussion of Roth, supra notes 93-120 and
accompanying text.
214. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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sioned by Hume and William Hogarth,215 the art-obscenity distinction
blurs in any society favoring the Romantic216 doctrine of aesthetic rel-
ativism. Contemporary society continues to struggle with these two
perspectives, and it remains to be seen whether it is possible to draw
the line at all.
2. Who Should Decide What Art Is?
Assuming that the Court's Miller test is right, and that worthy art
can be distinguished from worthless obscenity, to whom should the
difficult task fall? Should critics and art historians determine artistic
value? Should judges make the determination? Should artists? This
section will examine the problems with leaving this crucial task to any
of these groups.
a. Artists?
In Kois v. Wisconsin,2'7 the Supreme Court considered the artist's
subjective intent when determining whether the challenged work was
obscene or merely offensive. Although this approach would create a
substantial role for artists in obscenity determinations, it is difficult to
recommend. Aside from the difficulty of determining the true mo-
tives behind a work, leaving determinations of artistic value to artists
would give pornographers free reign. It also places artists whose
works reject overt artistic value in the difficult position of compromis-
ing their principles in order to save their art.
b. Art Insiders?
Art historians, critics, and curators shape the face of the artistic
world by praising, censuring, and discussing art. Yet limiting the defi-
nition of valuable art to include only that admired by art insiders
would leave a great deal of important material unprotected. Though
he had been producing artworks for twenty-five years, Hans
Haacke 21 8 only broke into the art world in 1987.219 Professor Benja-
215. In The Analysis of Beauty, Hogarth appeals to "the reader's eye, and common observa-
tion," and speaks of taste in common-sense terms, "in the way they are daily put in practice ..
Danto, supra note 210.
216. The Romantics argued that beauty overwhelms the rational intellect, and believed that
taste was a personal and emotional phenomenon. Id.
217. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
218. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
219. Buchloh, supra note 186, at 98. Before this time, only two American museums-Ohio
State University and the Allen Memorial Art Museum at Oberlin College-possessed any of his
works. Id. At the time of his breakthrough, only one museum in his native West Germany had
acquired any of his works. Id.
20031
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min Buchloh attributes Haacke's difficulty to, in part, his frequent in-
stitutional challenges: "[w]hat the reception of Haacke's work does
prove is that the supposedly all-embracing liberalism of high-cultural
institutions and of the market may be far more selective than is gener-
ally believed, and that those institutions can be rather rigorous in their
secret attacks of revenge and clandestine repression. '22 0 Haacke's ex-
perience teaches that the art establishment is not the detached, neu-
tral observer that should be entrusted with determinations regarding
artistic value.
Aside from the issue of bias, critical acclaim cannot be the arbiter of
artistic value because a great deal of valuable art never reaches the
gallery, museum, or critic. When critics are able to evaluate art, they
must wait until the work's intention comes into focus. 221 Folk art, out-
sider art,222 and new talent would thus be unprotected or underpro-
tected until it garnered critical acclaim.
c. Judges?
If artists and the art insiders cannot be trusted with determinations
of artistic value, should the question be left to the judiciary? Courts
have recognized since the last century that they were improper arbi-
ters of artistic value. In 1903, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ques-
tioned the ability of judges to evaluate the content of art:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations ... At the one extreme some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them re-
pulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether
220. Id.
221. Steinberg, supra note 190, at 63. To Norman Bryson, art history is in crisis:
It is a sad fact: art history lags behind the study of the other arts. Whether this unfortu-
nate state of affairs is to be attributed to the lethargy of the custodians of art ... or to
the particular history of the institutions devoted to the study of art ... or to some less
elaborate reason, such as the plain stasis, conservatism and inertia fostered by the soci-
ology of the profession of art history, I cannot say .... [Wihile the last three or so
decades ... have witnessed extraordinary and fertile change in the study of literature,
of history, of anthropology, in the discipline of art history there has reigned a stagnant
peace ....
Donald B. Kuspit, Conflicting Logics: Twentieth-Century Studies at the Crossroads, ART BULL.,
Mar. 1987, at 117 (quoting NORMAN BRYSON, VISION AND PAINTING: THE LOGIC OF THE GAZE
xi (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
222. Outsider art refers to artworks created by artists outside of established culture and soci-
ety. The term has broadened from its original definition to encompass works created by un-
trained or "naive" artists, and produced outside the "system" of galleries, schools, museums, and
other traditional forums. For general information, see Raw Vision: Definitions, at http://rawvi-
sion.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
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the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time.223
A half-century later, Justice William 0. Douglas added that judges
were "judges, not literary experts ... We are not competent to render
an independent judgment as to the worth of this or any other
book. ' '224 Justice Antonin Scalia's concurrence in Pope,2 2 5 however, is
perhaps the most revealing: "[f]or the courts to decide 'what is beauty'
is a novelty even by today's standards." 226
d. "Reasonable" Men and Women?
If artists, art insiders, and judges are not the proper arbiters of artis-
tic value, should the task fall to the rest of us? By leaving the decision
in the hands of the fact finder in Roth227 and Miller,228 the Supreme
Court seems to believe that ordinary men and women are best suited
to evaluate aesthetic and artistic value. Because of its estrangement
from traditional notions of beauty and aesthetic value, theirs is a
flawed belief.
Leo Steinberg noted that Americans have a long-standing suspicion
of art, and tend to associate art with "aristocracy and snob appeal,
with pleasure, wickedness and finesse. '229 Perhaps rightfully, those
outside the art community may often regard it with great wariness and
suspicion. 230 Publications like ArtForum, Art in America, and
ArtNews go largely unread by many people outside the industry.
231
Thus, individuals unfamiliar with the theory underlying a challenged
work may condemn a work as obscene based on superficial content
alone when asked to evaluate a sexually explicit artwork's value. 232
223. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
224. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
225. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
226. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
227. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
228. 413 U.S.15 (1973).
229. STEINBERG, supra note 190, at 56.
230. Kurzweg, supra note 160, at 443.
231. STANISZEWSKI, supra note 170, at 260. A recent review of Mental Floss Magazine's sug-
gestions for appreciating Jackson Pollock's artwork confirms Staniszewski's observation:
You can admit it, if it's true: Jackson Pollock's art gives you a headache. You really,
really want to get what all those lines and squiggles and colors mean, but it's just not
happening for you .. In [Mental Floss'] latest issue, [the magazine] covers the artist,
his turbulent life and his influences (besides booze). It also offers ways of looking at
the man's art that might not have occurred to you.
Wrapping Head Around Pollock Work, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2003, § 13 at 9. The magazine then
offers valid suggestions to help a viewer unfamiliar with Pollock's work fully appreciate its bril-
liance. "Aspirin, anyone?" the article's author retorts. Id.
232. Missouri Senator John Danforth's interpretation of several Mapplethorpe photographs is
revealing: "These are gross. These are terrible ... I do not think they are art ... and my guess is
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IV. IMPACT
By failing to reevaluate its obscenity doctrine, the United States Su-
preme Court risks robbing nonobscene, sexually explicit art of the
First Amendment protection it needs and deserves. This section ad-
dresses two potential consequences.
A. Consistent Inconsistencies
First, to best serve its noble goals, the boundaries of First Amend-
ment protection must be clearly delineated. 233 Based on the Western
belief that rational actors are free to steer between lawful and unlaw-
ful conduct, if it is possible to distinguish between the two,234 the phi-
losophy supporting American criminal law does not tolerate
convictions for actions not recognized as unlawful when they were
committed. 235 Where laws are made, they should explicitly describe
the behavior they proscribe, and must be enforced consistently and
equally.236 Without these characteristics, enforcement of the law be-
comes the kind of arbitrary, "cruel and unusual punishment" so ab-
horrent to the framers.237 Inconsistent, arbitrary laws affecting First
Amendment expression create a dangerous power in the hands of
those entrusted with their enforcement. Worse, laws like this open the
door to selective prosecution of those speakers or ideas law enforce-
ment find disagreeable, offensive, or inferior.238 Rather than drawing
a firm line between art and obscenity, the Miller test abdicates obscen-
ity decisions to fact finders unsuited to making the determination, 239
and fails to provide an adequate, objective tool by which to measure
the value of a work. 240 The murky art-obscenity distinction it forces
fact finders to draw invites arbitrary law enforcement 241 and self-cen-
sorship. Armed with this ambiguous test, law enforcement may capi-
that not a single resident of my state would like them." Adler, supra note 28, at 1372 (citing 135
CONG REC. S12116 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989)).
233. Kurzweg, supra note 160, at 453.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Greenberg & Tobiason, supra note 176, at 1408.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Judge Benjamin Cardozo seemed to have the virtues of con-
sistent law enforcement in mind when he remarked: "Our jurisprudence has held fast to Kant's
categorical imperative, 'Act on a maxim which thout canst will to be law universal.' It has re-
fused to sacrifice the larger and more inclusive good to the narrower and smaller .... " Green-
berg & Tobiason, supra note 176, at 1384.
238. H. Franklin Robbins, Jr. & Steven G. Mason, The Law of Obscenity-Or Absurdity? 15
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 517, 536 (2003).
239. See supra notes 218-232 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 142-232 and accompanying text.
241. Robbins & Mason, supra note 238, at 531.
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talize on the vague parameters of obscenity jurisprudence to
prosecute galleries and museums for exhibiting works they find offen-
sive, while leaving nonoffensive, though equally sexual, materials
alone.242 This haphazard prosecution leaves artists like Karen Finley,
who uses explicit sexuality and offensive symbolism to communicate
deeper socio-political messages, particularly vulnerable. 243
The flip side of arbitrary law enforcement is self-censorship. The
most pernicious and deleterious kind of suppression, self-censorship
occurs when artists elect not to perform, display, or publish a work
rather than risk an adverse government response.2 44 Harmful because
it prevents speech from ever reaching a public debate about its artistic
merit,245 the temptation to stifle one's own expression may become
242. Punishing artists whose works challenge the borders established by society and their ar-
tistic predecessors and condemning as obscenity those works that deal with the same subject
matter, have the highly unsatisfactory effect of punishing artists not for their explicit content, but
for treating it in a certain way.
Many critics, for example, have interpreted the floral paintings of twentieth-century American
artist Georgia O'Keeffe as symbolic allusions to female genitalia. Upon viewing a 1925 exhibi-
tion of the artist's works, the New Yorker's art critic reported, "The show is strong: one long
loud blast of sex, sex in youth. sex in adolescence, sex in maturity, sex bulging, sex tumescent, sex
deflated. After this description, you'd better not visit the show: inevitably you'll be a little
disappointed. For perhaps only half the sex is on the walls; the rest is probably in me." Jackie
Wullschlager, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 2002, at 16. Though the artist denied that
her simplified floral images were veiled allusions to sexuality, "three-quarters of a Freudiansied
century later, our uncertain response persists." Id. The lesson here is two-fold. On one hand,
O'Keeffe's works illustrate the pervasive influence of sexuality on art-whether in the artist's
mind or the viewer's eye. On the other hand, the popularity of these works reveals society's
willingness to embrace works with extreme and explicit subject matter so long as it is depicted
via symbolism, allusion, and metaphor.
243. Salzman notes:
As illustrated by the example of performance art, creativity is more and more often
used to give birth to images that are calculated to shock. Many of these images will
inevitably be sexual in nature because of the psychological force of sex combined with
heavy social taboos imposed upon it. As artists continue to rail against the constraints
placed upon them by legal and public morality, it is doubtful offensive art will just go
away - art presumably will continue, for a long while at least, to provoke negative
emotion and outrage.
Salzman, supra note 33, at 1257.
244. The Harrisburg affair is an extreme example of self-censorship. Concerned that circular
forms in an abstract painting visible from the state capitol rodunda would be interpreted as a
woman's breasts, state officials requested that that particular work be removed from view. Bur-
ton Caine, The Dormant First Amendment, 2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 227, 240 (1993).
This is an unfortunate act of institutional censorship in and of itself; even worse is the fact that
the artist whose work was removed censored himself in order to avoid state censorship, by with-
holding paintings he feared would arouse comment. Id.
245. Id.
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overwhelming when it is impossible to determine a priori the extent of
First Amendment protection for one's expression. 246
B. Secondary Effects?
Until recently, speech was viewed as either protected or unpro-
tected.247 In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the Su-
preme Court's viewpoint shifted, and several justices began to
embrace the notion that "not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance. '248 Having achieved a "curious persistence '249 in recent
years, this conception of First Amendment expression is often re-
ferred to as the low value speech theory. Home to fighting words,
child pornography, as well as obscenity, the Court has denied low-
value speech constitutional protection because it makes only minimal
contributions to the social discourse. 250
Professor Jeffrey Shaman argues that Roth251 is "a manifestation of
low-value speech theory in pristine form. ' 252 In Roth, the Court flatly
refused to balance the potential for harm in the challenged speech
against the potential harm in censorship, and explained only that ob-
scenity was not "speech" and, therefore, not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.25 3 While the Court's refusal to extend protection to
the broad and enigmatic category of obscenity is itself quite troubling,
the secondary effects doctrine-a consequence of this refusal-has
the potential to substantially censor Postmodern artistic expression.
A victory for civic republicans like Professor Cass Sunstein,254 the
secondary effects doctrine upholds speech regulations seeking to "re-
246. See generally Robbins & Mason, supra note 238, at 532-33 (pointing out that it is impossi-
ble to positively identify obscenity until it is identified by the United States Supreme Court as
such, and that before this time, a speaker can only attempt to guess what an "average person"
would regard his image or performance in light of his or her community's standards).
247. Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low Value Speech, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 195, 196 (2001).
248. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low Value Speech, 48 SMU L. Rev. 297, 298 (1995)
(quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (holding credit reports are matters of purely private concern and, as
such, of lesser First Amendment value than matters of public concern)).
249. Id. at 300.
250. Id. Commentators have suggested adding a number of other categories of expression,
from hate speech to pornography, to the catalogue of low value speech. Id. at 300.
251. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476.
252. Shaman, supra note 248, at 305.
253. Id. at 308.
254. Professor Sunstein supports a Madisonian interpretation of the First Amendment that
views freedom of expression as a means to a greater social end. Kurzweg, supra note 161, at 440.
Although he believes free speech is critical to the development of a deliberative democracy,
Sunstein argues that too much speech-particularly speech that bears little or no connection to
the ultimate democratic goal-falls within the First Amendment's protective embrace. See gen-
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duce the harmful non-speech antecedent effects that derive from cer-
tain types of speech. ' 255 Under this doctrine, speech can be restricted
with little or no showing of harm,256 because Roth views obscenity as
nonspeech and, therefore, requires no balancing of interests. 257 Al-
though the secondary effects doctrine's roots lie in zoning ordinances
affecting adult entertainment,258 courts have expressed a willingness
to expand the scope of the doctrine to sexually explicit speech that is
offensive but not obscene. 259 The transformation of this inclination
into a legal reality is a frightening prospect for Postmodern and Con-
temporary artists like Mapplethorpe and Finley.
Unless and until expression is deemed obscene, expression with sex-
ual content is entitled to the full array of First Amendment protec-
tions. Among these is the requirement that courts balance the
benefits of censorship against the harms of the potential expression.
To regulate nonobscene expression, a court must find that the speech
subject to the regulation causes harm. For example, the Court upheld
a statute prohibiting the distribution of child pornography in New
York v. Ferber260 after it determined that production of the material
was harmful to the physiological, mental, and emotional health of the
children involved. 261
Unlike child pornography, sexually explicit speech involving adult
subjects has never been conclusively linked to any actual harm. In
1970, the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
challenged the longstanding assumption that obscenity caused antiso-
cial behavior. 262 Its majority report concluded that exposure to erot-
ica had "little or no effect" on attitudes about sex or morality and had
erally Brandon K. Lemley, Effectuating Censorship: Civic Republicanism and the Secondary Ef-
fects Doctrine, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189 (2002). Consequently, Sunstein and the civic
republicans support restrictions on speech as a means to promote public deliberation. Id. at 201.
When regulating specific categories of speech, Sunstein proposes a two-tiered approach to the
First Amendment: if the speech involved falls within the constitutional "core," it can be regu-
lated only if it poses grave harm; speech falling outside this core may be regulated upon a show-
ing of "sufficiently weighty reasons." Id. at 202.
255. Lemley, supra note 254, at 192.
256. See Caine, supra note 244, at 234.
257. Shaman, supra note 248, at 301.
258. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding local
prohibition of adult movie theaters within one thousand feet of any other regulated use); City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (upholding statute prohibiting operation of
adult movie theaters within one thousand feet of residences, churches, parks, and schools based
on negative secondary effects associated with these establishments).
259. Lemley, supra note 254, at 192-93.
260. 458 U.S. 747 (1981).
261. Id. at 758.
262. Shaman, supra note 248, at 307.
2003]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
little impact on sexual behavior. 263  Despite Professor Catharine
MacKinnon's passionate arguments to the contrary,264 the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence supports the conclusions of the 1970
commission.265
Based on this evidence, any harm posed by nonobscene sexually
explicit speech does not rise to the level which would justify denying it
full First Amendment protection. Application of the secondary ef-
fects doctrine to nonobscene sexually explicit speech is thus little
more than paternalistic censorship, with the state-censor imposing the
standards of popular morality upon the public in an attempt to shield
the people from offensive-but harmless-speech. 266
Although offensive to the morals and sensibilities of many viewers,
subordinating freedom of expression to the desire of unwilling viewers
to be shielded from objectionable images is no solution to the problem
posed by sexually explicit Contemporary art. To the contrary,
preventing artists from challenging the status quo of social, gender,
and sexual norms by dismissing any such content as low value speech,
courts effectuate the private moral judgments of the majority. 267 In so
doing, they meddle with the individual right of self-realization of the
artists whose works they condemn, 268 clipping the artists' wings before
they are fully grown. 269 Society is also harmed by the failure to fully
protect the freedom of all its artists, for it is often society that benefits
the most from its artwork. Art is a vehicle for new ideas and self-
expression, a critical element in the search for the universal truths.270
Indeed, the art most valuable to society may well be its most contro-
versial, for these shocking works bravely force society to confront new
challenges and answer the difficult questions. 27' By punishing works
that make it uncomfortable, a society punishes those who choose to
263. Id. at 306-07.
264. Professor MacKinnon argues that pornography "reflects and reinforces the subordinating
structure of male sexuality and power." Greenberg & Tobiason, supra note 177. at 1386 (quoting
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 171 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). To MacKinnon, no distinction should be drawn between valuable and valueless
works; so long as a woman is subjugated, any value in the expression is irrelevant. Id. Pornogra-
phy with artistic merit may, in fact, be more harmful than obscenity because it is better able to
construct the reality of female submission. Id. at 1402.
265. Gaede, supra note 81, at 449.
266. Lemley, supra note 254, at 193.
267. Id.
268. Salzman. supra note 33, at 1245.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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"shame the devil and tell the truth. ' 272 That a government cannot
tolerate unfettered artistic liberty, in the end, is more a commentary
on that society than on the art and the individuals it seeks to silence.
No government censors speech it perceives to be harmless. 273
While Mapplethorpe's photographs and Finley's confrontational per-
formances contain graphic, explicit, and even offensive images, they
also contain insight and ideas. More dangerous than guns, according
to Vladimir Lenin,274 ideas challenge society to grow and develop, to
discard outdated prejudices and break free of the status quo. The cen-
sorship effectuated by the Supreme Court's inadequate obscenity ju-
risprudence cannot "save" America from moral corruption and decay.
If our society collapses, it will not be because people were allowed to
view a Mapplethorpe photograph, attend a Finley performance, or
read Joyce's Ulysses. It will collapse because Americans stood pas-
sively by and watched their civil rights and liberties drain away. To
borrow a phrase from an outstanding essay on the absurdity of ob-
scenity law, "the loss of freedom in a democracy must surely come like
a slowly rising river whose danger we do not perceive until the water
is already rising under our door. '2 75
V. CONCLUSION
American First Amendment jurisprudence fails to provide adequate
protection to Postmodern artists like Robert Mapplethorpe and Karen
Finley. When applied to artworks with controversial, sexually explicit
imagery, the prevailing obscenity test is unable to distinguish valuable
art from valueless, unprotected obscene expression. Lacking the orig-
inality, authenticity, and serious value required to prove their works
possess the serious artistic value required by Miller, these artists teeter
on the brink of censorship.
On a more theoretical level, the United States Supreme Court's
First Amendment doctrine wrongly assumes that artistic value-or art
itself, for that matter-can be objectively defined in a one-size-fits-all
272. Lawrence Duell, commenting on Sexus, the explicitly sexual first book of Henry Miller's
trilogy The Rosy Crucifixion, recognized:
By its very nature, such a task must transgress the narrow limits of ... the search for
truth. Often the result is shocking, terrifying; but then the truth has always been a
fierce oracle rather than a bleat or a whimper ... It isn't pretty, a lot of it, but then
neither is real life.
Salzman, supra note 33, at 1247.
273. Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity, Pornography and Free Speech, 60 BROOK. L.
REV. 1037, 1061 (1997).
274. Greenberg & Tobiason, supra note 176. at 1414.
275. Robbins & Mason, supra note 238, at 544.
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test. The Court also wrongly believes that the fact finders charged
with separating art from obscenity can objectively determine the pres-
ence or absence of artistic value.
The consequences of these failures for Contemporary American art
are profound. By failing to provide a useful tool to use in obscenity
determinations, the Court has opened the door to arbitrary enforce-
ment and, in time, self-censorship. More troubling, however, is that
the Court's refusal to acknowledge the value inherent in controversial
artworks allows valuable art to be lumped into the category of low
value speech based on its superficial content and regulated based on
its secondary effects.
Grounded in the belief that censorship is more dangerous than free
speech could ever be, the First Amendment requires tolerance and
protection for all expression, whether it is beloved, reviled, rejected,
or embraced. The time has come for the Supreme Court to recognize
the valuable role Contemporary art, even at its most controversial,
plays in society. The time has come for the Court to open its mind to
Contemporary art, and to extend this art the protection it deserves.
Cara L. Newman*
* I would like to thank Professor Mark Weber for his thoughtful comments on an earlier
draft of this Comment. I am infinitely grateful for the patience and support of family.
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